Meixner class of non-commutative generalized stochastic processes with freely independent values I. A characterization

Let $T$ be an underlying space with a non-atomic measure $\sigma$ on it (e.g. $T=\mathbb R^d$ and $\sigma$ is the Lebesgue measure). We introduce and study a class of non-commutative generalized stochastic processes, indexed by points of $T$, with freely independent values. Such a process (field), $\omega=\omega(t)$, $t\in T$, is given a rigorous meaning through smearing out with test functions on $T$, with $\int_T \sigma(dt)f(t)\omega(t)$ being a (bounded) linear operator in a full Fock space. We define a set $\mathbf{CP}$ of all continuous polynomials of $\omega$, and then define a con-commutative $L^2$-space $L^2(\tau)$ by taking the closure of $\mathbf{CP}$ in the norm $\|P\|_{L^2(\tau)}:=\|P\Omega\|$, where $\Omega$ is the vacuum in the Fock space. Through procedure of orthogonalization of polynomials, we construct a unitary isomorphism between $L^2(\tau)$ and a (Fock-space-type) Hilbert space $\mathbb F=\mathbb R\oplus\bigoplus_{n=1}^\infty L^2(T^n,\gamma_n)$, with explicitly given measures $\gamma_n$. We identify the Meixner class as those processes for which the procedure of orthogonalization leaves the set $\mathbf {CP}$ invariant. (Note that, in the general case, the projection of a continuous monomial of oder $n$ onto the $n$-th chaos need not remain a continuous polynomial.) Each element of the Meixner class is characterized by two continuous functions $\lambda$ and $\eta\ge0$ on $T$, such that, in the $\mathbb F$ space, $\omega$ has representation \omega(t)=\di_t^\dag+\lambda(t)\di_t^\dag\di_t+\di_t+\eta(t)\di_t^\dag\di^2_t, where \di_t^\dag and \di_t are the usual creation and annihilation operators at point $t$

Free Meixner states

Free Meixner states are a class of functionals on non-commutative polynomials introduced in math.CO/0410482. They are characterized by a resolvent-type form for the generating function of their orthogonal polynomials, by a recursion relation for those polynomials, or by a second-order non-commutative differential equation satisfied by their free cumulant functional. In this paper, we construct an operator model for free Meixner states. By combinatorial methods, we also derive an operator model for their free cumulant functionals. This, in turn, allows us to construct a number of examples. Many of these examples are shown to be trivial, in the sense of being free products of functionals which depend on only a single variable, or rotations of such free products. On the other hand, the multinomial distribution is a free Meixner state and is not a product. Neither is a large class of tracial free Meixner states which are analogous to the simple quadratic exponential families in statistics.Comment: 30 page

Social welfare in one-sided matchings: Random priority and beyond

We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the problem. We prove that the approximation ratio of random priority is Theta(n^{-1/2}) while no truthful-in-expectation mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than O(n^{-1/2}), where n is the number of agents and items. Furthermore, we prove that the approximation ratio of all ordinal (not necessarily truthful-in-expectation) mechanisms is upper bounded by O(n^{-1/2}), indicating that random priority is asymptotically the best truthful-in-expectation mechanism and the best ordinal mechanism for the problem.Comment: 13 page

On the Complexity of tt-Closeness Anonymization and Related Problems

An important issue in releasing individual data is to protect the sensitive information from being leaked and maliciously utilized. Famous privacy preserving principles that aim to ensure both data privacy and data integrity, such as $k$-anonymity and $l$-diversity, have been extensively studied both theoretically and empirically. Nonetheless, these widely-adopted principles are still insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure if the attacker has partial knowledge about the overall sensitive data distribution. The $t$-closeness principle has been proposed to fix this, which also has the benefit of supporting numerical sensitive attributes. However, in contrast to $k$-anonymity and $l$-diversity, the theoretical aspect of $t$-closeness has not been well investigated. We initiate the first systematic theoretical study on the $t$-closeness principle under the commonly-used attribute suppression model. We prove that for every constant $t$ such that $0\leq t<1$, it is NP-hard to find an optimal $t$-closeness generalization of a given table. The proof consists of several reductions each of which works for different values of $t$, which together cover the full range. To complement this negative result, we also provide exact and fixed-parameter algorithms. Finally, we answer some open questions regarding the complexity of $k$-anonymity and $l$-diversity left in the literature.Comment: An extended abstract to appear in DASFAA 201

Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local

We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (Fabrikant et al., PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game was first studied only recently (Bil\`o et al., SPAA'14), where a worst case locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria. Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy-changes. Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on the price of anarchy.Comment: An extended abstract of this paper has been accepted for publication in the proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Mathematical Foundations on Computer Scienc

Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Mechanisms

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms. We show that two well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial, and Random Priority, achieve a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property, and show stronger bounds on the Price of Anarchy of all deterministic mechanisms

The Firefighter Problem: A Structural Analysis

We consider the complexity of the firefighter problem where b>=1 firefighters are available at each time step. This problem is proved NP-complete even on trees of degree at most three and budget one (Finbow et al.,2007) and on trees of bounded degree b+3 for any fixed budget b>=2 (Bazgan et al.,2012). In this paper, we provide further insight into the complexity landscape of the problem by showing that the pathwidth and the maximum degree of the input graph govern its complexity. More precisely, we first prove that the problem is NP-complete even on trees of pathwidth at most three for any fixed budget b>=1. We then show that the problem turns out to be fixed parameter-tractable with respect to the combined parameter "pathwidth" and "maximum degree" of the input graph

Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship

We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is to produce such an assignment that minimizes the social cost, i.e., the total distance between the most-preferred points of the agents and their corresponding facilities in the assignment, under the constraint of truthfulness, which ensures that agents do not misreport their most-preferred points. We propose a resource augmentation framework, where a truthful mechanism is evaluated by its worst-case performance on an instance with enhanced facility capacities against the optimal mechanism on the same instance with the original capacities. We study a very well-known mechanism, Serial Dictatorship, and provide an exact analysis of its performance. Although Serial Dictatorship is a purely combinatorial mechanism, our analysis uses linear programming; a linear program expresses its greedy nature as well as the structure of the input, and finds the input instance that enforces the mechanism have its worst-case performance. Bounding the objective of the linear program using duality arguments allows us to compute tight bounds on the approximation ratio. Among other results, we prove that Serial Dictatorship has approximation ratio $g/(g-2)$ when the capacities are multiplied by any integer $g \geq 3$. Our results suggest that even a limited augmentation of the resources can have wondrous effects on the performance of the mechanism and in particular, the approximation ratio goes to 1 as the augmentation factor becomes large. We complement our results with bounds on the approximation ratio of Random Serial Dictatorship, the randomized version of Serial Dictatorship, when there is no resource augmentation

On Linear Congestion Games with Altruistic Social Context

We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework, given a real matrix $\Gamma=(\gamma_{ij})$ specifying a particular social context, each player $i$ aims at optimizing a linear combination of the payoffs of all the players in the game, where, for each player $j$, the multiplicative coefficient is given by the value $\gamma_{ij}$. We give a broad characterization of the social contexts for which pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist and provide tight or almost tight bounds on their prices of anarchy and stability. In some of the considered cases, our achievements either improve or extend results previously known in the literature

Matching Dynamics with Constraints

We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to another agent. Each agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it can be matched with. However, depending on the constraints and the current state of the game, not all possible partners are available for matching at all times. For correlated preferences, we propose and study a general class of hedonic coalition formation games that we call coalition formation games with constraints. This class includes and extends many recently studied variants of stable matching, such as locally stable matching, socially stable matching, or friendship matching. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that all these variants are encompassed in a class of "consistent" instances that always allow a polynomial improvement sequence to a stable state. In addition, we show that for consistent instances there always exists a polynomial sequence to every reachable state. Our characterization is tight in the sense that we provide exponential lower bounds when each of the requirements for consistency is violated. We also analyze matching with uncorrelated preferences, where we obtain a larger variety of results. While socially stable matching always allows a polynomial sequence to a stable state, for other classes different additional assumptions are sufficient to guarantee the same results. For the problem of reaching a given stable state, we show NP-hardness in almost all considered classes of matching games.Comment: Conference Version in WINE 201